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• 作者：VivianMame 发布时间：2019-08-26 08:02:29

  ~190826

• 作者：越石赋扶风 发布时间：2021-01-11 15:19:22

  以前一直以为卢舍那大佛佛像是武则天的肖像的观点是龙门石窟为了宣扬旅游景点制造的噱头，没想到还真有这么多中外学者站台…高宗咸亨年间建造的卢舍那大佛，当然不会以武后的肖像为范本，这是显而易见的ps后记感人，译者真的是用爱发电

• 作者：蝴蝶 发布时间：2024-04-23 19:01:05

  感觉聂的很痛快

  吴和师兄的有点意思 但是师兄不如吴

  一口饼吃不下分几口吃掉和不贪吃

• 作者：馍仁铂鸥 发布时间：2021-01-06 18:03:21

  布鲁克林生产队队长，电气时代我们再会，哈哈哈哈。

• 作者：晴天胖胖 发布时间：2020-11-19 10:05:18

  不是一本可以随便读读的书 针对六十局的棋谱，江铸久加了很多随笔性质的笔记和注解。 适合打谱用

• 作者：黛安不是黛安娜 发布时间：2023-12-16 18:40:30

  2022.11

• 第7章摘抄&笔记

  作者：舒袖 发布时间：2021-01-24 03:23:36

  Chapter 7 The neuroscience of free will 自由意志的神经科学

  pp.222-257

  pp.222

  Can neuroscience, and the other sciences of the mind, shed light on one of the oldest and most difficult of all philosophical problems, the problem of free will and moral responsibility?

  But if we were determined to act as we did, then we were not free, or morally responsible.

  P.223

  当代有很多哲学家是相容论者，他们认为

  自由意志和决定论是可相容的

  。

  相容论者的论证：

  1.对于强迫、控制等的因果性问题，自由意志与决定论是不相容的。I am unfree, certainly, if my actions are controlled by another agent: if, for instance, my desires and beliefs are simply irrelevant to what I end up doing. If someone physically manipulates me, or holds a gun to my head, then my actions have their source in someone else, and I am not responsible for them.

  但问题是，决定论者determinism的事实证据并不能说明我们的行为是被他人强迫或控制的。即使他们是对的，但理性施动者依然有做他们喜欢的事情的自由。

  2.如果第一条的判断很难，那么简单的问法是：自由意志如何与indeterminism（非决定论）【不确定性理论】相容？(p.224)

  举例量子力学，用概率而非决定的等式（deterministic equations）来描述亚原子粒子的行为。On the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, these equations capture the nature of physical reality: the equations are probabilistic because the world is fundamentally indeterministic.但是，当代物理学对非相容论者支持保留自由意志的观点的帮助有限：

  2.1即使在亚原子层面是自由的，但是到了宏观的角度这些特色或许就被消除了，一切行为都变得可预测。（所以一切看上去都是被决定的和可预测的：亚原子层面的非决定性似乎被抹去了）

  2.2假设亚原子层面的非决定论能影响人在宏观上的复杂行为，那有什么帮助呢？If I am not free, despite the fact that I can do what I want when I want, how does the fact that sometimes – due to a random event – I

  fail

  to do what I want when I want to enhance my freedom?这样结果就恰恰相反：非决定性会减少（而不是增加）我的自由，因为我并不能控制亚原子的行为。

  不相容论者通常会认为，将确定性等同于强制或外部控制是错误的。但他们还有其他理由认为确定性与自由意志不相容。他们指出，即使我们能做所有我们能够做的事情，我们也依然不是自由的：如当别人控制着我们的欲望的时候。

  相容论者对此的回应是：区分了一阶和二阶的欲望。【一阶是我喜欢xx；二阶是我希望我喜欢xx】——我们可能在一阶上是不自由的，但是我们可以在二阶上是自由的。

  （但不相容论者也在关于因果论的信念上有更多的差异差异：Some incompatibilists are determinists, and therefore hold that there is no free will in our world (Pereboom 2001). Some deny that determinism is true; they therefore hold that some actions (at least) are free. These incompatibilists are known as libertarians (Kane 1996; Ekstrom 1999; O’Connor 2000).

  P.225

  本章主旨：1.回顾是否有自由意志的难题，以及道德责任（神经科学家论证我们是不自由的，并不是因为我们的行为是被决定的，而是因为我们不能意识到是什么造成了我们的行为）2.在个体层面考察我们不断增长的知识对于心灵的认识；3.从而来论证，神经科学所展示的不是没有人可以负责，而是说谁是要负责的，而谁不是。Rather than neuroscience showing that no one is ever responsible, I shall argue, attention to its discoveries will help us to see who is responsible, and who is not.

  who decides when I decide?当我做决定的时候，是什么在做决定？

  一般认为： consciousness plays no direct role in decision-making or volition

  但是像(Libet et al. 1983). 这样的人，做了实验，检测出 ‘‘readiness potential’’ (RP) 可读性潜能，会在行动的400毫秒前发生；所以，主体对行为的意识是在RP实现的之后才产生的。

  这个实验被看作证明没有自由意志的经验性证据。 Libet 也说，意志或行动在因果性上来得太慢了（不高效）

  但是，作为我们所要赞美或批评的施动者，如果不是与意识不同，那至少是与意识在亚人格层面上因果性有效的机制相比，要与意识更加同一。事实证明，我们不做决定，而是决定因我们而造。但，如果我们不能控制自己能够做出什么决定，那么我们就不能为我们的行动负责。

  But the agent, the target of ascriptions of praise and blame, is, if not identical to consciousness, at least more properly identified with consciousness than with the subpersonal mechanisms that are, as a matter of fact, causally effective in action. It turns out that we do not make our decisions; they are made for us. But if we cannot control what we decide to do, then we cannot be responsible for our decisions (Zhu 2004).3

  P.228

  介绍 Wegner’s version of the threat

  他和libet结论相同： that consciousness does not initiate action. 意识不引发行为。

  P.229

  他区分了两种意志：1) phenomenal will – our experience of our will as causally effective – and 2) the empirical will; the actual causal mechanisms of behavior.

  当我们将第一个错误误认为第二个名称时，当我们将因果关系的经验直接反映为现实时，就产生了同义的“意识意志的幻象”。实际上，我们的经验是行动迟来的，不可靠的记录。 它本身既不是因果力，也不是实际因果力的直接反映。

  Neither has demonstrated, anywhere near conclusively, that consciousness does not initiate action or make decisions. 【意识并不能引发行为也不能做决定】However, though these philosophers have won this battle, I suspect they will lose the war: consciousness does not, in fact, play the kind of role in action that Libet and Wegner believe to be required in order for us to be morally responsible. 【所以，意识也不能负道德责任】We should therefore get on with assessing whether, and how, moral responsibility might be compatible with the finding that consciousness does not initiate actions or make decisions

  P.231

  consciousness and moral responsibility 意识与道德责任

  似乎，意识是道德责任所需要的。

  举例 Ken Parks：他梦游开车到自己的公婆家，然后杀了他们，但是没有意识到，后来时候回忆起来，就去告诉警察自己杀人了。

  P.233

  we can identify the self with a much broader network of states and mechanisms; if these states and mechanisms cause our actions, then we cause them.

  If we are not conscious of our decisions at the precise instant we make them, they seem to think, then we do not fully control them. ……If we are fully and actively to control our actions, we require an active causal power to intervene in the decision-making process. 如果我们充分主动地控制自己的行动，则需要积极的因果力量来干预决策过程。

  Decision constraint 决策约束: the alleged requirement that we able to exercise such an active causal power in decision-making

  P.234

  The process of decision-making: either we could weigh our reasons, or we could weight them 【We weigh reasons when we try to find out how significant they are for us, given our beliefs, values, plans, goals and desires. We weight reasons when we assign them a weight and thereby a significance for us, either ignoring any preexisting weight they might have had, or varying it. 】

  【

  衡量理由对你的重要性和相关性；或者忽视或减少理由对你决策的影响

  。】但是，当我们在做决定的时候，是衡量理由对我们的重要性而不是忽略他们。

  p.235

  we take ourselves to be weighing reasons, and not weighting them. We try to discover how much things really do matter to us, not decide to make them matter to us – not, at least, in the way we would if were weighting them.

  P.236

  But, these philosophers argue, if my decisions can only go one way, they are determined, and therefore they are not free. We have already seen that there are reasons to doubt the claim that the mere fact that someone’s actions are determined entails that they are not free; the claim seems even weaker when, as here, the worry is that our decisions are determined by

  our own values and beliefs

  . 作者在这里不去辩护这个意见，他把关注重点集中在衡量权重理由如何能增强我们的自由上。

  If you make decisions by assigning weights to your reasons, varying the weight that they would have for you were you instead to weigh them, you make your decision arbitrarily.

  如果你能通过改变理由的权重而改变选择，那么你的决定就是任意的，就是增加了我们的自由。【作者这里并没有考虑我们的决定是被我们自己的价值观和信念所决定的质疑】

  p.237

  If that’s right, though, we do not need an

  active causal power

  【积极因果力？】at all. Free decision-making can instead be a passive process: it can proceed by way of a mechanism that, like a set of scales, simply aggregates the weight of our reasons and measures which set is the weightier.

  Once we recognize that we do not need or want an active causal power, the claim that consciousness does not learn of the agent’s decisions until after they are already underway no longer seems threatening.

  两个反驳意见：

  1.it might be pointed out that people frequently choose in defiance of their reasons; they suffer from weakness of the will and find themselves choosing against their own better judgment.

  2. it might be held that though we must decide in light of our reasons, we can nevertheless take them as mere guides, rather than as determinants of what we must do: perhaps the weights that our reasons have for us are reported to consciousness, or at any rate to an active causal power that is intrinsically conscious, which then decides whether or not to vary them.

  P.240

  moral responsibility without the decision constraint

  The picture I am urging is this: even though the decision constraint cannot be satisfied, even though consciousness doesn’t make our decisions, consciousness matters for moral responsibility because conscious deliberation – typically – greatly improves the quality of the decisions the subpersonal mechanisms ultimately cause. 意识对于道德责任之所以重要，是因为，深思意识大幅提升了因果性在亚人格层面的决定机制。

  深思也是一个向自己提出问题的过程。仔细考虑问题，以便我们的亚人格机制可以解决这些问题，并将解决方案反馈给我们-从而得到互相的反馈。——因此，我们说高质量的深思更能体现我们真实的自我。

  p.242

  举例：冷血的谋杀要比无意识杀人更不好。 Murder ‘‘in cold blood’’ is worse than unpremeditated killing, because a planned action better reflects my settled convictions, my sense of what really matters, my values, whereas a spontaneous action reflects only a part of my self, and perhaps a relatively inessential part at that.

  Agents like Parks act only on a small subset of their action plans, policies, desires and goals. Their actions do not reflect their deepest selves, their settled convictions. Since the agent was not even conscious, we have good reason to think that their action is less reflective of their identity as practical agents than even the spontaneous and immediate actions of the agent who acts (for instance) under provocation, or who acts negligently. Thus, an action performed in a state of automatism is not attributable to the agent as an individual. Of course, it might be reflective of the agent; a thoroughly bad agent is as susceptible to entering the state of automatism as a good. But when a bad action performed in a state of automatism is reflective of the agent, it is only by chance that this is so. The bad agent did not have the opportunity to think twice, and therefore cannot be blamed for their action. 【当我们的亚人格机制在做决定的时候，才称作是“我们”在做决定。】

  p.243

  我的决定反映了我的历史，学习和经验； 如果我思考的东西没有深深地影响我所做的一切，那么我将以完全无法解释的方式进行选择。

  Decision-making cannot be conscious – that is, caused by consciousness – but that needn’t matter, for the mechanisms that make the decision are nevertheless ours, us; they have our values, they have our beliefs, our goals (we have them by them having them), and when they decide, we decide如果决定决策不能由意识所造就，但那也并不重要，因为那个做决定的机制还是属于我们的，我们有自己的价值观和信念——当它们决定的时候，也就是我们决定。

  P.244

  Lessons from neuroscience

  The forgoing pages were devoted to resolving (to my own satisfaction, at least) the problem of how we can be free even if – even though – consciousness does not cause our actions: in other words, to seeing off a threat from neuroscience. I now want to turn to some more positive lessons from neuroscience, and related fields; lessons we can and ought to apply in our practices of blaming and holding to account, including our practices of punishing wrongdoers. I shall argue that

  our growing understanding of the brain and its pathologies is directly relevant to our moral and legal treatment of one another.

  Some agents who we would currently punish for wrongdoing ought to be excused from all blame; others ought to be punished less severely. In both kinds of cases, we ought to reduce sentences or mitigate censure because

  these agents do not (fully) meet the conditions properly laid down for moral responsibility,

  and

  they do not meet these conditions due to brain abnormalities.

  作者认为应当为行动者免责：1.行动者没有完全满足在为道德责任规定的适当条件，2.大脑出现异常，不能满足这些条件。

  反对意见（认为神经科学不应对我们的道德责任归属产生影响）：

  Gazzaniga (2005), for instance, argues that responsibility is a moral notion, and that morality is one thing and science another. Morse (2004, 2006) argues that those who believe that psychopathology can diminish moral responsibility confuse abnormal causation with excuse.

  Philosophers investigating moral responsibility have usually sought to reveal the underlying logic of responsibility ascriptions. They have typically done this by trying to discover what factors lead us to excuse others of responsibility for actions they have performed. There is a range of situations in which it is uncontroversial that agents ought to be excused, even though they have performed a wrongful act.

  发现vs发明：

  Once we understand the logic of excuses, we see that our practices of praising and blaming reflect facts about the nature of moral reality, as we perceive it. Justifications and excuses are not invented, as Gazzaniga thinks, but

  discovered

  : we rightfully blame another when, and only when, he or she performs a wrongful action that expresses ill will towards others.

  Our moral practices are not mere constructs, but instead

  reflect

  facts

  about the world, and about the nature of

  agents

  in the world: Do they really know what they’re doing? Do they control their actions?

  【于是有了各种认知测试cognitive test】

  the famous M’Naghten Rules

  , introduced in the mid-nineteenth century in England. These rules state that defendants are to be found not guilty if it is proved that:

  at the time of the committing of the act, the party ACCUSED was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong

  .

  p.246

  仅当代理人不了解他或她在做什么时，M'Naghten才会辩解，但如果他们完全理解，但仍无法防止自己做出错误的举动，该怎么办？If the agent was compelled, say by kleptomania, to steal, they do not exhibit any ill will.

  Morse (2004, 2006) argues that abnormal causes are not excusing causes. He is surely right that we can’t infer that an abnormal cause excuses just because it is abnormal. But he is mistaken in thinking that no abnormal cause could be excusing. That depends upon the details of the cause.

  小结：

  We can acquire new knowledge, from neuroscience and allied fields, about whether agents understand (in the relevant fashion) what they are doing when they perform a morally wrongful action, and about whether they possess relevant control over what they do. Neuroscience can therefore expand our knowledge of when the excusing conditions apply.

• 第二章读后感

  作者：按时 发布时间：2021-06-02 17:29:11