中央音乐学院海内外钢琴考级教程 周广仁 主编,中央音乐学院考级委员会 编 人民音【正版保证】 下载 pdf 电子版 epub 免费 txt 2025

本套教材是在总结和继续完善旧教材的基础上诞生的，它改变了过去的A、B两套曲目的做法，采用了不同系列归类的方式，扩大曲目的范围，从而使教师和学生有了更多的选择的可能，其中，我们也保留了一些在过去几年的实践中，被认为十分有教学价值的曲目，它们和许多新选教材的组合，将有利于提高钢琴学习灵活性、多样性和趣味性。这套教材的使用，对于学生扩大知识面和提高应变能力将会发挥的作用。

一、基本练习

二、练习曲

1.练习曲

2.练习曲 Op.72 No.4

3.练习曲 Op.72 No.12

4.练习曲 Op.70 No.6

5.练习曲 No.7

6.练习曲 OP.25.No.2

三、复调乐曲

1.前奏曲与赋格《平均律钢琴曲集》第二册 No.12

2.前奏曲与赋格 《平均律钢琴曲集》册No.6

3.回旋曲《帕蒂塔组曲》No.2

4.前奏曲与赋格《平均律钢琴曲集》册No.13

5.前奏曲与赋格《平均律钢琴曲集》第二册No.15

四、大型乐曲

1.奏鸣曲 Op.10 No.1第三乐章 终曲

2.奏鸣曲 Op.7乐章

3.C大调奏鸣曲 乐章

4.奏鸣曲 K.457乐章

5.奏鸣曲 K.310乐章

五、小型乐曲

1. 夜曲 Op.55 No.1

2.圆舞曲Op.70 No.1

3.浪漫曲Op.28 No.2

4.幽灵之舞Op.39 No.8

5.亚麻色头发的少女

6.前奏曲 No.2

7.波兰舞曲Op.40 No.1

8.月光

9.小丑

10.前奏曲 Op.12 No.7

11.序曲

12.平湖秋月

13.旱天雷

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书籍介绍

中央音乐学院海内外钢琴（业余）考级教程（六 第九级），ISBN：9787103021620，作者：周广仁主编；中央音乐学院考级委员会编

• 作者：Fragrance 发布时间：2010-12-25 14:17:25

  对于没考我很怨念。

• 作者：皮皮一号 发布时间：2010-07-20 17:07:45

  好疼的钢琴键。

• 作者：90 发布时间：2014-04-18 00:02:36

  一本很差劲的书！千万别买！它的心理论述太让我失望了！

• 作者：追风筝的人 发布时间：2013-07-01 23:26:29

  over ten years ago

• 作者：白泽 发布时间：2016-02-25 11:46:47

  169页的是九级的书，我可以明确告诉你这一点；你说这是六级，到时出了问题，你也有责任，对吧？

• 作者：猪 发布时间：2009-05-02 21:20:11

  我没赶上这本书 不过据说很恶心

• 列宁：《唯物主义和经验批判主义》读书笔记

  作者：诚明 发布时间：2021-05-22 23:06:08

  向报告人提十个问题

  坚持马克思主义哲学是辩证唯物主义（dialectical materialism）。【1】（1）报告人是否承认马克思主义哲学是辩证唯物主义？如果不承认，那么他为什么一次也不去分析恩格斯关于这一点的无数言论？如果承认，那么为什么马赫主义者把他们对辩证唯物主义的“修正”叫作“马克思主义哲学”？（2）报告人是否承认：恩格斯把哲学体系基本上分为唯物主义和唯心主义，把近代哲学中的休谟路线看作是介于两者之间、动摇于两者之间的中间派，称这条路线为“不可知论”并说康德主义是不可知论的变种？（3）报告人是否承认辩证唯物主义认识论的基础是承认外部世界及其在人脑中的反映？（4）报告人是否承认恩格斯关于“自在之物”转化为“为我之物”的论断是正确的？（5）报告人是否承认恩格斯的“世界的真正的统一性是在于它的物质性”这个论断是正确的？（6）报告人是否承认恩格斯的“没有运动的物质和没有物质的运动是同样不可想象的”这个论断是正确的？（7）报告人是否承认因果性、必然性、规律性等等观念是自然界、现实世界的规律在人脑中的反映？或者恩格斯这样说是不正确的。（8）报告人是否知道，马赫曾经表示他赞同内在论学派的首领舒佩的观点，甚至还把自己最后的一本主要哲学著作献给舒佩？马赫这样地附和僧侣主义的维护者、哲学上露骨的反动分子舒佩的露骨的唯心主义哲学，报告人怎样解释？（9）报告人的昨天的同志（根据《论丛》）、孟什维克尤什凯维奇今天（跟着拉赫美托夫）宣称波格丹诺夫是唯心主义者，报告人为什么对这件“怪事”避而不谈？报告人是否知道，彼得楚尔特在最近的一本著作中把马赫的许多门徒列入唯心主义者？（10）报告人是否确认这样的事实：马赫主义和布尔什维主义毫无共同之处；列宁不止一次地反对过马赫主义；孟什维克尤什凯维奇和瓦连廷诺夫都是“纯粹的”经验批判主义者？【1-2】[1. Does the lecturer acknowledge that the philosophy of Marxism is dialectical materialism? If he does not, why has he never analysed Engels' countless statements on this subject? If he does, why do the Machists call their "revision" of dialectical materialism "the philosophy of Marxism"? 2. Does the lecturer acknowledge Engels' fundamental division of philosophical systems into idealism and materialism, Engels regarding those intermediate between these two, wavering between them, as the line of Hume in modern philosophy, calling this line "agnosticism" and declaring Kantianism to be a variety of agnosticism? 3. Does the lecturer acknowledge that recognition of the external world and its reflection in the human mind form the basis of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism? 4. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels' argument concerning the conversion of "things-in-themselves" into "things-for-us"? 5. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels' assertion that the "real unity of the world consists in its materiality"? (Anti-Dühring, 2nd ed., 1886, p. 28, section 1, part IV on world schematism.) 6. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engels' assertion that "matter without motion is as inconceivable as motion without matter"? (Anti-Dühring, 1886, 2nd ed., p. 45, in part 6 on natural philosophy, cosmogony, physics and chemistry.) 7. Does the lecturer acknowledge that the ideas of causality, necessity, law, etc., are a reflection in the human mind of laws of nature, of the real world? Or was Engels wrong in saying so? (Anti-Dühring, S. 20-21, in part III on apriorism, and S. 103-04, in part XI on freedom and necessity.) 8. Does the lecturer know that Mach expressed his agreement with the head of the immanentist school, Schuppe, and even dedicated his last and chief philosophical work to him? How does the lecturer explain this adherence of Mach to the obviously idealist philosophy of Schuppe, a defender of clericalism and in general a downright reactionary in philosophy? 9. Why did the lecturer keep silent about "adventure" with his comrade of yesterday (according to the Studies ), the Menshevik Yushkevich, who has today declared Bogdanov (following in the wake of Rakhmetov) an idealist? Is the lecturer aware that Petzoldt in his latest book has classed a number of Mach's disciples among the idealists? 10. Does the lecturer confirm the fact that Machism has nothing in common with Bolshevism? And that Lenin has repeatedly protested against Machism? And that the Mensheviks Yushkevich and Valentinov are "pure" empirio- criticists? pp.1-2.]

  第一版序言

  针对想当马克思主义但又攻击辩证唯物主义的作者而言。“所有这些人都不会不知道，马克思和恩格斯几十次地把自己的哲学观点叫作辩证唯物主义。然而所有这些因敌视辩证唯物主义而联合起来的人（尽管政治观点截然不同）在哲学上又自命为马克思主义者！”【7】（All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism. Yet all these people, who, despite the sharp divergence of their political views, are united in their hostility towards dialectical materialism, at the same time claim to be Marxists in philosophy! pp.5.）

  代绪论 某些“马克思主义者”在1908年和某些唯心主义者在1710年是怎样驳斥唯物主义的

  马赫主义者或“经验批判主义者”反对唯物主义。【13】考察贝克莱的《人类知识原理》，认为马赫主义者的“新”发现是对基本哲学派别的历史惊人无知的结果。【18】列宁指出，[让我们把外部世界、自然界看作是神在我们心中所唤起的“感觉的组合”吧！承认这一点吧！不要在意识之外，在人之外去探索这些感觉的“基础”吧！这样我将在我的唯心主义认识论的范围内承认

  全部

  自然科学，承认它的结论的全部意义和可靠性。为了我的结论有利于“和平和宗教”，我需要的正是这个范围，而且只是这个范围。这就是贝克莱的思想。这个正确地表达了唯心主义哲学的本质及其社会意义的思想，我们以后在谈到马赫主义对自然科学的态度时还会碰到。]【21-2】（Let us regard the external world, nature, as "a combination of sensations" evoked in our mind by a deity. Acknowledge this and give up searching for the "ground" of these sensations outside the mind, outside man, and I will acknowledge within the framework of my idealist theory of knowledge

  all

  natural science and all the use and certainty of its deductions. It is precisely this framework, and only this framework, that I need for my deductions in favour of "peace and religion." Such is Berkeley's train of thought. It correctly expresses the essence of idealist philosophy and its social significance, and we shall encounter it later when we come to speak of the relation of Machism to natural science. pp.19.）“现在我们只作出一个结论：‘最新的’马赫主义者提出来反对唯物主义者的论据，没有一个，的确没有一个是贝克莱主教没有提出过的。”【30】（For the present we shall confine ourselves to one conclusion: the "recent" Machians have not adduced a single argument against the materialists that had not been adduced by Bishop Berkeley. pp.29.）

  第一章 经验批判主义的认识论和辩证唯物主义的认识论（一）

  “唯物主义和自然科学完全一致，认为物质是第一性的东西，意识、思维、感觉是第二性的东西。”【39】（Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as primary and regards consciousness, thought, sensation as secondary pp.38.）[唯物主义（它认为自然界、物质是第一性的）和唯心主义（它认为精神、意识、感觉是第一性的）之间的对立]【49】

  第二章 经验批判主义的认识论和辩证唯物主义的认识论（二）

  三个认识论结论：（1）物是不依赖于我们的意识、不依赖于我们的归纳绝而在我们之外存在着的；（2）在现象和自在之物之间决没有而且也不可能有任何原则的差别，差别仅仅存在于已经认识的东西和尚未认识的东西之间；【100】（3）在认识论上和在科学的其他一切领域中一样，我们应该辩证地思考，也就是说，不要以为我们的认识是一成不变的，而要去分析怎样从不知到知，怎样从不完全的不确切的知到比较完全比较确切的知。【101】[（1）Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it. （2）There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is "beyond" phenomena (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) — all this is the sheerest nonsense, Schrulle, crotchet, invention. pp.110. （3）In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact. pp.111.] 实践作为唯物主义认识论的基础。【139】“生活、实践的观点，应该是认识论的首要的和基本的观点。这种观点必然会导致唯物主义，……实践标准实质上决不能

  完全地

  证实或驳倒人类的任何表象。这个标准也是这样的“不确定”，以便不让人的知识变成“绝对”，同时它又是这样的确定，以便同唯心主义和不可知论的一切变种进行无情的斗争。如果我们的实践所证实的是唯一的、最终的、客观的真理，那么，因此就得承认：坚持唯物主义观点的科学的道路是走向这种真理的唯一的道路……实践标准即

  一切

  资本主义国家近几十年来的发展进程所证明为客观真理的，是马克思的

  整个

  社会经济理论，而不是其中的某一部分、某一表述等等……从马克思的理论是客观真理这一为马克思主义者所同意的见解出发，所能得出的唯一结论就是：

  沿着

  马克思的理论的

  道路

  前进，我们将愈来愈接近客观真理（但决不会穷尽它）；而

  沿着任何其他的道路

  前进，除了混乱和谬误之外，我们什么也得不到。”【144-5】（The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge. And it inevitably leads to materialism, brushing aside the endless fabrications of professorial scholasticism. Of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely. This criterion also is sufficiently "indefinite" not to allow human knowledge to become "absolute," but at the same time it is sufficiently definite to wage a ruthless fight on all varieties of idealism and agnosticism. If what our practice confirms is the sole, ultimate and objective truth, then from this must follow the recognition that the only path to this truth is the path of science, which holds the materialist point of view. pp.161. …… But inasmuch as the criterion of practice, i.e., the course of development of all capitalist countries in the last few decades, proves only the objective truth of Marx's whole social and economic theory in general, and not merely of one or other of its parts, formulations, etc., it is clear that to talk of the "dogmatism" of the Marxists is to make an unpardonable concession to bourgeois economics. The sole conclusion to be drawn from the opinion of the Marxists that Marx's theory is an objective truth is that by following the path of Marxist theory we shall draw closer and closer to objective truth (without ever exhausting it); but by following any other path we shall arrive at nothing but confusion and lies. pp.162.）

  第三章 经验批判主义的认识论和辩证唯物主义的认识论（三）

  物质和意识的对，也只是在非常有限的范围内才有绝对的意义，在这里，仅仅在承认什么是第一性的和什么是第二性的这个认识论的基本问题的范围内才有绝对的意义。超出这个范围，这种对立无疑是相对的。【150】（even the antithesis of matter and mind has absolute significance only within the bounds of a very limited field — in this case exclusively within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is indubitable. pp.167-8.）批评马赫主义者的“经验”老早就在掩盖唯心主义体系，这个概念的不同“定义”表现着恩格斯所说的哲学上的两条基本路线。【153】因果关系，马赫主义者重复康德和休谟在因果性问题上不可知论的错误。【173】“思维经济原则”和“世界统一性”问题。空间和时间。自由和必然。恩格斯最后点出马赫的折中主义和唯心主义倾向。【199】

  第四章 作为经验批判主义的战友和继承者的哲学唯心主义

  列宁这一章考察的是马赫和阿芬那留斯对康德的关系。列宁对康德哲学的理解是，“康德哲学的基本特征是调和唯物主义和唯心主义，使二者妥协，使不同的相互对立的哲学派别结合在一个体系中。”【205】（The principal feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism, a compromise between the two, the combination within one system of heterogeneous and contrary philosophical trends. pp.232.）批评马赫主义跟着哲学上的反动派别走（休谟主义和贝克莱主义），而非费尔巴哈-马克思-恩格斯的整个学派走向否定一切唯心主义和不可知论。【211】（Thus the entire school of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels turned from Kant to the Left, to a complete rejection of all idealism and of all agnosticism. But our Machians followed the reactionary trend in philosophy, Mach and Avenarius, who criticised Kant from the standpoint of Hume and Berkeley. Of course, it is the sacred right of every citizen, and particularly of every intellectual, to follow any ideological reactionary he likes. But when people who have radically severed relations with the very foundations of Marxism in philosophy begin to dodge, confuse matters, hedge and assure us that they "too" are Marxists in philosophy, that they are "almost" in agreement with Marx, and have only slightly "supplemented" him — the spectacle is a far from pleasant one. pp.240.）这种两条路线，康德出发，唯物主义者向左走，马赫主义者向右走的观点贯穿。【249】

  第五章 最近的自然科学革命和哲学唯心主义

  这一章考察了现代物理性和哲学唯心主义的联系，并继续坚持两条路线的斗争。“在马赫主义中，和这个学派有联系的，不是使马赫主义同其他一切唯心主义哲学的流派和体系相区别的东西，而是马赫主义和整个哲学唯心主义共有的东西。”【317】产生“物理学”唯心主义的原因，一是科学进步本身产生的反动意向，二是相对主义的原理（知识的相对性），不懂得辩证法的情况下这个原理必然导致唯心主义。【322】列宁认为这是他们没有能够直接地和立即地从形而上学的唯物主义上升到辩证唯物主义而滚入了反动的哲学。【327】（In a word, the "physical" idealism of today, just as the "physiological" idealism of yesterday, merely means that one school of natural scientists in one branch of natural science has slid into a reactionary philosophy, being unable to rise directly and at once from metaphysical materialism to dialectical materialism. This step is being made, and will be made, by modern physics; but it is making for the only true method and the only true philosophy of natural science not directly, but by zigzags, not consciously but instinctively, not clearly perceiving its "final goal," but drawing closer to it gropingly, hesitatingly, and sometimes even with its back turned to it. pp.377-378.）

  第六章 经验批判主义和历史唯物主义

  经验批判主义在社会科学领域，指出马恩学说从费尔巴哈那里产生，特别注意唯物主义哲学的上层，也就是唯物主义历史观而非唯物主义认识论，“特别强调的是

  辩证

  唯物主义，而不是辩证

  唯物主义

  ，特别坚持的是

  历史

  唯物主义，而不是历史

  唯物主义

  。”【345】（Marx and Engels, as they grew out of Feuerbach and matured in the fight against the bunglers, naturally paid most attention to crowning the structure of philosophical materialism, that is, not to the materialist epistemology but to the materialist conception of history. That is why Marx and Engels laid the emphasis in their works rather on

  dialectical

  materialism than on dialectical

  materialism

  , why they insisted rather on

  historical

  materialism than on historical

  materialism

  . pp.399.）注意第四节，“哲学上的党派和哲学上的无头脑者”。列宁指出以上整个叙述过程探究了唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争。[我们总是毫无例外地看到，在解决哲学问题上有两条基本路线，两个基本派别。是否把自然界、物质、物理的东西、外部世界看作第一性的东西，而把意识、精神、感觉（用现今

  流行的

  术语来说，即经验）、心理的东西等等看作第二性的东西，这是一个

  实际上

  仍然把哲学家划分为

  两大阵营

  的根本问题。]忽略了这两个基本情绪是错误和糊涂观念的根源。【351】[Throughout the preceding exposition, in connection with

  every problem of epistemology touched upon and in connection with every philosophical question raised by the new physics, we traced the struggle between

  materialism

  and

  idealism

  . Behind the mass of new terminological devices, behind the litter of erudite scholasticism, we invariably discerned

  two

  principal alignments, two fundamental trends in the solution of philosophical problems. Whether nature, matter, the physical, the external world should be taken as primary, and consciousness, mind, sensation (experience — as the

  widespread

  terminology of our time has it), the psychical, etc., should be regarded as secondary — that is the root question which

  in fact

  continues to divide the philosophers into

  two great camps

  . The source of thousands upon thousands of errors and of the confusion reigning in this sphere is the fact that beneath the envelope of terms, definitions, scholastic devices and verbal artifices, these two fundamental trends are

  overlooked

  . pp.406-7.]“当马克思刚刚成为马克思，即刚刚成为科学社会主义的创始人，成为比以往一切形式的唯物主义无比丰富和彻底的

  现代唯物主义

  的创始人的时候，他就已经异常明确地只出了哲学上的根本路线。”【352】（We said, "nearly half a century." And, indeed, as far back as 1843, when Marx was only becoming Marx, i.e., the founder of scientific socialism, the founder of modern materialism, which is immeasurably richer in content and incomparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism, even at that time Marx pointed out with amazing clarity the basic trends in philosophy. pp.408.）特别举出《资本论》把马克思的唯物主义与黑格尔的唯心主义（最彻底最发展的唯心主义）对立起来，马克思始终不变的主旨即坚持唯物主义，反对唯心主义。【353】（And finally, take the various philosophical utterances by Marx in Capital and other works, and you will find an invariable basic motif, viz., insistence upon materialism and contemptuous derision of all obscurity, of all confusion and all deviations towards idealism. All Marx's philosophical utterances revolve within these two fundamental opposites pp.409.）“和马克思完全一致并同马克思密切合作的恩格斯，在自己的一切哲学著作中，在

  一切

  问题上都简单明白地把唯物主义路线跟唯心主义路线对立起来。”【354】（Entirely in the spirit of Marx, and in close collaboration with him, Engels in all his philosophical works briefly and clearly contrasts the materialist and idealist lines in regard to

  all

  questions. pp.409.）“

  马克思和恩格斯在哲学上自始至终都是有党性的，他们善于发现一切‘最新’流派对唯物主义的背弃，对唯心主义和信仰主义的纵容。

  ”【355】（

  Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from start to finish, they were able to detect the deviations from materialism and concessions to idealism and fideism in each and every "new" tendency.

  pp.411.）

  结论

  列宁指出马克思主义者应从四个角度评价经验批判主义：把这种哲学的理论基础和辩证唯物主义的理论基础加以比较（如前三章从认识论揭露其唯心主义和不可知论的十足反动性）；必须确定检验批判主义这个哲学专家们的小学片在现代其他哲学学派中的地位；必须注意到，马赫主义与现代自然科学的一个门类中的一个学派有着无可怀疑的联系；【374】“

  在经验批判足以认识论的烦琐语句后面，不能不看到哲学上的党派斗争，这种斗争归根到底表现着现代社会中敌对阶级的倾向和思想体系。最新的哲学象在2000年前一样，也是有党性的。唯物主义和唯心主义按实质来说，是两个斗争着的党派。唯物主义和唯心主义按实质来说，是两个斗争着的党派，而这种实质被冒牌学者的新名词或愚蠢的无党性所掩盖。唯心主义，不过是信仰主义的一种精巧圆滑的形态，信仰主义全副武装，它拥有庞大的组织，继续不断地影响群众，并利用哲学思想上的最微小的动摇来为自己服务、经验批判主义的客观的、阶级的作用完全是在于提信仰主义者效劳，帮助他们反对一般唯物主义，特别是反对历史唯物主义。

  ”【375】（behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism one must not fail to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle which in the last analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society. Recent philosophy is as partisan as was philosophy two thousand years ago. The contending parties are essentially, although it is concealed by a pseudoerudite quackery of new terms or by a feeble-minded non-partisanship, materialism and idealism. The latter is merely a subtle, refined form of fideism, which stands fully armed, commands vast organisations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage. The objective, class role of empirio-criticism consists entirely in rendering faithful service to the fideists in their struggle against materialism in general and historical materialism in particular. pp.434-435.）

• 评论中央音乐学院海内外钢琴（业余）考级教程

  作者：豆花 发布时间：2010-05-07 18:51:19

  配套的讲解学习视频这个还是很不错的

  http://www.5ikeke.com/lesson/kj_gq/index.htm