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《秩序的沦陷》为著名汉学家卜正民教授近著，关注的是抗战初期的社会与人。作者选取江南五城（嘉定、镇江、南京、上海、崇明）为例，描述了日军残暴占领城市、试图重建基层机构的过程，并分析地方头面人物与日伪政府的关系交织。“这里有通敌，有抵抗，但两者之外的其他行为要多得多。”借助对这种模糊行为的分析，作者考察了战争时期城市秩序的维持，以及生活其间的个人的心态、处境与选择，以求揭示一个复杂的战时社会。

致谢

略语表

第一章 关于“合作”

第二章 计划

第三章 外观：嘉定

第四章 成本：镇江

第五章 共谋：南京

第六章 竞争：上海

第七章 抵抗：崇明

第八章 组建占领政权

结论 消失的四类历史真相

注释

参考文献

索引

卜正民，著名汉学家，历任多伦多大学、斯坦福大学等校教授，英国牛津大学邵氏汉学教授，现为加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学圣约翰学院历史系教授。卜正民学术视野广阔，主要从事亚洲历史和文化的研究，研究领域涉及明代社会和文化史、“二战”时期日本在中国的占领等。代表著作有：《为权力祈祷：佛教与晚明中国士绅社会的形成》、《纵乐的困惑：明代的商业与文化》、《明代的国家与社会》、《维梅尔的帽子：从一幅画看全球化贸易的兴起》、《杀千刀：中西视野下的凌迟处死》等。

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书籍介绍

《秩序的沦陷》为著名汉学家卜正民教授近著，关注的是抗战初期的社会与人。作者选取江南五城（嘉定、镇江、南京、上海、崇明）为例，描述了日军残暴占领城市、试图重建基层机构的过程，并分析地方头面人物与日伪政府的关系交织。“这里有通敌，有抵抗，但两者之外的其他行为要多得多。”借助对这种模糊行为的分析，作者考察了战争时期城市秩序的维持，以及生活其间的个人的心态、处境与选择，以求揭示一个复杂的战时社会。

• 作者：犹在镜中 发布时间：2019-12-03 17:32:47

  历史是由芸芸众生创造的，也是由芸芸众生体验着。

• 作者：千利休士 发布时间：2017-03-12 22:55:47

  追问生命的意义并无教益，人必须让自己沉浸在生活的洪流之中，让疑问随水流逝。

• 作者：树上 发布时间：2019-01-09 20:40:24

  材料不多，写得啰嗦，枯燥无味。

• 作者：rainbug 发布时间：2017-11-02 22:10:39

  材料太少，观点也只是常识，但是很欣赏这样的写法。

• 作者：豆友4764757 发布时间：2021-01-21 18:26:43

  2019-4-7 中译标题与副标题文不对题，看来也是一种自我审查式的无奈之举了，卜正民在结论所说的“第二种干扰合作史研究的评判是政治层面的”，恰恰在本书标题上印证了，真是讽刺。不过能出版也是功德无量。鉴于材料的稀缺，研究做到这个水平也没什么可以苛责的了。但是还是感觉外国人不是很能深度理解collaboration在国人文化心理层面的问题。于我而言，此书给我的惊艳的地方在于collaboration破坏了基层传统精英的政治合法性，倒是便宜了CCP以严格的纪律性规范夺取基层政权。

• 作者：奥数帝 发布时间：2019-06-05 17:19:46

  以前就觉得合作者有很多种，不全是汉奸，本书又向我叙述了这种事实。虽然现在的我知道合作者有很多面孔，觉得这书啰嗦、观点不新颖。但未来的人、其他国家的人他们未必知道。

• 转载一篇国外学者的书评的书评

  作者：benshuier 发布时间：2011-04-23 23:15:28

  原文网址

  http://www.froginawell.net/china/2006/04/review-of-timothy-brooks-collaboration/

  我没得到作者授权就私自拿来了...如果要引用的话请多加注意

  Review of Timothy Brook’s Collaboration

  Filed under: Books China-Japan English War— K. M. Lawson @ 7:33 pm Print

  In the most recent issue of The Journal of Asian Studies there is a review of Timothy Brook‘s new work Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China written by Susan Glosser. I was very disappointed with this review which, except for a few conciliatory lines in the beginning of the review, was very critical of Brook’s work. While I agree with Glosser on one or two points, I found her to be far too harsh, sometimes irrelevant (she complains that he does not offer a glossary with the Chinese names of all the organizations mentioned, but they can be found under the index entry for every organization) and in several instances clearly wrong in her assessment of the book, which I believe is a truly excellent contribution to the scholarship on Chinese collaboration during the occupation.

  Timothy Brook’s work is a careful look at the issues surrounding Chinese wartime collaboration through a close examination of a number of case studies from the Yangtze delta. With the exception of some work I have read in Japanese and some coming out of Taiwan, this is the most detailed source based research I have seen of this kind to date.

  Here I just want to contest three points in Glosser’s critique of Brook’s work that I think particularly unfair. She argues that 1) Brook doesn’t discuss the “problem of generalizing from one city to another.” 2) She complains about Brook’s allegedly unproblematized use of the word “pacification” (such as in referring to Japan’s “pacification teams.”) 3) Glosser spends almost a third of the review critiquing Brook’s “desire to avoid moral judgments” and his allegedly “neutral stance” on issue of Chinese collaboration.

  On the first count, Glosser is certainly correct in worrying about the generalization involved, but I think Brook is also well aware of the dangers and admirably avoids them in many places more adventurous scholars would not. He has already focused his study on only one area of occupied China, the Yangtze delta, and laments, in some detail, the paucity of available sources. He goes into considerable length to describe his sources and the various problems which accompany them in his opening chapter, even showing specific examples of the kinds of contradictions present and strategies he used. He works with Japanese sources (writings of the pacification team members), Chinese sources (such as memoirs), and Western sources (witnesses in Nanjing, for example) depending on their availability.

  I am more than satisfied by his explanation that, “I chose seven cities and counties across the Yangtze Delta for intensive study. This selection was not based on whether the sites were typical or unique (some would prove to be one, some the other, and some both), but only on whether the documentation was sufficiently dense to allow for a more than superficial portrait of what local people did in the face of military occupation…After the case studies were written, I chose to include in the book five that were sufficiently distinct in terms of the themes that the sources allowed me to explore…”1 and did not find any of his major claims to be based solely on individual findings in any one city or place. On the contrary, I imagine the accusation of generalization would be particularly offensive to Brook since he has urged the reader to try to overcome some of the stereotypes and classic images we have of the wartime collaborators and allow for the many different forms and levels of cooperation with the occupying forces, their varying motivations, costs, and ultimately levels of moral responsibility.

  Glosser for some reason takes issue with the fact that Brook uses the term “pacification teams” which is a direct translation of the Japanese term. She seems so concerned that we maintain a sufficiently condemnatory tone in our work on Japan’s activities in occupied China that this direct translation doesn’t seem to be sufficiently insidious. I find no issue with the fact that he calls these teams by the best English translation available (“pacification” is originally 宣撫, which in one of its two related definitions in Japanese specifically means to pacify a people in an occupied territory), especially since he does not, by this, ever try to hide the fact that the Japanese were guilty of horrible atrocities.

  She says that he uses the word “pacification” for “his own description of events (p. 134)” but I can’t find any use of that word on the page, for any purpose. Instead, page 134 makes use of another term which we are all familiar with, when he discusses Japanese “counterinsurgency operations” in Nanjing. It is on the same page where he notes Japanese military promises to offer “care for disarmed Chinese soldiers” even as they carried out a policy of executing captured soldiers in Nanjing and, at the bottom of that page tells of the summary execution of fifty policemen which had just been promised permission to operate after negotiations with Nanjing’s International Committee.

  Finally, Glosser seems to think that Brook has a “neutral stance” with respect to collaboration and wants to “avoid moral judgments.” I’m afraid this kind of comment shows that she has completely misread Brook’s careful argument. Perhaps she missed Brook’s simple request in his introduction that, “All I ask of the reader is to suspend judgment as to who is guilty for having worked with the Japanese until after we have seen them at work.”2 Brook wants to point out that the costs and consequences of collaboration, its form, and the motivations are all very much tied up in the contingencies of specific situations. Also, he reminds us that, “Ambiguity of intention is only half the problem. There is also the ambiguity of unknowable consequences.”3 He is “neutral” to collaboration in one important respect: the word “collaboration” is already a morally loaded word, and I think he would argue that without some special care, this can get in the way of any interesting and productive look at the interactions between Chinese and Japanese during the war.

  I think Glosser fundamentally misunderstands Brook when she protests his claim that “history does not fashion moral subjects, nor produce moral knowledge.” I completely agree with her when she says that, “All histories [are] embedded in an ethical view of the world.”4 However, I’m not sure how Brook is to be understood as denying this. Brook admits how his own “ethical view of the world” has affected his description of some of the historical figures he describes in the book. On the very same page as his comment about moral knowledge, he has this to say, “Without question, many of [the choices of collaborators] were venal in inspiration and destructive in impact, and the historian is not disqualified from documenting that venality or tracking the damage these choices led to and declaring them to be damaging. I have found it impossible to suspend my personal distaste for some of the characters who appear in this book, and it would be facetious to suggest that the reader should, particularly when the consequences of collaboration were as stark as they were in a place like Nanjing.” I think what Brook, who it might be noted collected and edited the important Documents on the Rape of Nanking (1999), wants to argue for is a more careful consideration of some of the “inconvenient facts” that produce a more complex picture – a complexity that we must face if we are to have any chance at understanding the kinds of choices faced by individuals every day in extreme times. It is because of some of these ambiguities that we cannot “deduce the causes that prompted people to act from the moral claims we impose, nor evaluate their actions solely in relation to consequences the actors could not anticipate.”5 This is as true for collaborators with the Japanese occupation regime as it is with anyone who collaborated with Chinese Communist regime in its most violent hour, and as it is for the daily choices of policemen, soldiers and government officials of an occupied Iraq today. An analytic calculus of atrocity and the clarity of hindsight does not help us in the least in understanding the people thrust into extreme positions during times such as war, occupation, imperial domination, or under highly repressive governments — or for that matter the choices they faced.

  1. Timothy Brook Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 26-27.

  2. ibid. 13.

  3. ibid. 241.

  4. Susan Glossar review of Brook’s book in Journal of Asian Studies vol. 65 no. 1, 149

• 中国泥潭

  作者：维舟 发布时间：2016-05-23 10:40:43

  人类很奇怪，往往在面对极端复杂纠结的困境时，却愈加要求个人只能做出惟一正确的选择。在异族入侵造成的乱世中，可想会涌现出无数日常所不可能有的特殊情形（这也正是这些年代具有吸引力的地方之一），一个恪守道德的人几乎无法在这种环境中活下来。然而，长久以来，按我们历史教科书的叙述，八年抗日战争是一场摩尼教式的善恶大决战：入侵者是坏人，抵抗者是好人——抵抗得越坚决越好，任何妥协、合作、甚至即便只是在斗争的态度上比较消极的人，都一律是在帮助敌人。

  当然，这在某种程度上也不能算错。在沦陷区，就算是保护南京大屠杀幸存者的那些西方人，他们固然堪称英雄乃至圣徒，但在客观上，他们帮助安顿难民也有助于日军统治下的征服秩序，何况如本书所言，在当时的情形下，“顺从日本占领者是帮助中国人的唯一办法”。在战争这种极端复杂的处境中，弱者的选择很少，而且通常都不可能是那种在道德上毫无瑕疵的选择。除了自杀外，唯一能免受谴责的行为是抵抗，然而不争的事实是：无论是在古今中外哪一场对抗入侵者的战争中，大部分沦陷区的平民都根本不具有抵抗的手段和技能，而那些抵抗的游击队固然英雄，却也不时会从民间榨取粮食或经费，否则他们也无法生存下去。说实话，如果日寇当时面临的仅仅是抵抗和通敌的两类中国人，那他们的任务倒也轻松多了。

  这种道德化的历史叙述最终会把自己逼到死角，因为它很难解释这样一个现象：既然投敌当汉奸分明是极可耻的事，那为什么还有人这么干？要说他们都道德败坏，但南京沦陷后那个钻营的王承典在通敌的同时却也在庇护难民。如果说他们是为了捞取个人的好处，但关于镇江案例的分析又显示，日伪组织由于经常面临财政枯竭的窘境，出任伪镇江市长的郭志诚甚至连自己的亲弟弟也无法保护，看来又谈不上有多大的好处。这样，如果仍坚持按道德话语来解释，我们就只能放弃对这些历史人物复杂性的把握，而归结为一个简单偷懒的理由：他们都是坏人，而且是愚蠢的坏人。

  卜正民在《沦陷的秩序》中建议，我们不如试着从另一个角度来看待沦陷区建立社会秩序的种种现象。他强调一种深入到历史细节的、去道德化的技术性分析，“只有通过细节，我们才能判断地方头面人物的所作所为，他们有时顺从，有时抵制，一个‘占领政府’是不那么容易接受通常的安抚方式的。只有通过细节，我们才学会质疑想当然的事，并且认识到将抵抗和通敌视为水火不容、完全对立的两极是很少与事实相符的。”

  在分析了嘉定、镇江、南京、上海、崇明这五个城镇在沦陷初期的经历之后，他意在表明：在当时那种极端的环境下，共谋、竞争、抵抗都是可能存在的，而日军为了给自己的统治以合法性，也不得不谋求打造一个过得去的“外观”，但这又牵涉到“征服成本”的问题——入侵并不总是有利可图。由此我们也可以更好地理解，日本侵略者当时试图建立的“新秩序”为何会失败：它既缺乏一套能赢得人心的合法性说辞，又无法给合作者带来更多机会和好处，甚至都不足以支付自己发动这场战争的成本，其结果，到后来就越来越依靠强制榨取，而这又进一步激起沦陷区人民更强烈的反感和抵抗意识。

  客观地说，沦陷初期的种种混乱，虽然在后来都被证明成了日本人的棘手问题，但这其实都是日本人自己造成的。在战争全面爆发之后，日本仍缺乏长远战略，一心只想来一次惩罚性远征，结果，虽然在军事上节节胜利，但离自己的政治目标却反而越来越远——因为它越是进攻，中国中央政府就越是迫于全国的压力而无法与它妥协谈判。不仅如此，日军在长江三角洲还未获授权组建政权，结果虽然占领了敌方首都南京，随后却出现了一种危险的政治真空状态，不仅迟迟未能找到一个像维希政权那样的谈判对手，相反倒造成了自己也难以收拾的一地鸡毛局面，这恐怕是一个征服者所能做的最蠢的事。

  虽然关于“征服成本”的分析是本书最吸引人的观点之一，不过平心而论，日本在实施入侵计划时，恐怕很难说他们是像一家公司的董事一样，是从“征服中国每年将带来多少收益、收支能否相抵”的角度来思考问题的。的确，关东军曾于1930年12月颁行《对占领地区统治的研究》，对未来三阶段内在东三省的收支做过规划；但在日本主要战略规划者的眼里，战争却不是一门生意，他们更惯于从政治和军事角度看问题。九一八事变前夕，板垣征四郎就曾明言：“现在的满洲，从经济上看虽无太大的价值，但在国防上对将来打日本的建设却是绝对必要的战略据点”。日本发动全面侵华战争的目的暧昧不清，但很难说是为了榨取被征服地区的经济利益。要说从经济学角度理性看待中日关系的，倒是战前的日本外相币原喜重郎，但他的主张却与军部相反，因为他认为：在中国的扩张应该是经济扩张，在尊重“门户开放”和“领土完整”的架构下，日本可以保护和发展在中国的权益，获得比直接出兵更大的好处。如果日本人纯从成本和收益的角度分析，那入侵中国本身就不见得是最优选择，对吗？

  从现有的研究来看，日本帝国主义当时对大陆的扩张冲动，是一种混杂着浪漫主义的政治盘算。一如一位被派往战后地区收拾残局的宣抚班日本人所言，那时他们脑子里充满着“难以置信的天真和充满了不切实际的空想”。他们期望着黄种人将西方势力完全驱离，但却又完全缺乏将中国视为平等伙伴的意识，而轻蔑地认为中国是一个“无国家社会”。在当时日本陆军中的不少“支那通”身上都能看出这样的毛病：一方面期待一个革新的中国，一方面却未意识到这样的一个中国首先要打倒的就是日本帝国主义。他们缺乏把中国作为一个他者的尊重，其结果反倒阻碍了他们理解中国人的心理，与此同时又无法真正信赖中国人，在这种情况下，也就无怪他们会发现前来投效的只能是某些“三流人物，甚至更糟”。当遇到挫败时，他们更不顾一切地发泄自己的非理性冲动——把镇江60%的商业区一把火烧掉，在南京大肆烧杀——这完全不像是曾经理性地考虑过征服成本和政治后果。

  要说在战争中理性地盘算各种利益的，说不定倒是卜正民这项研究遗漏的另一个角色：伪军。台湾学者刘熙明在《伪军——强权竞逐下的卒子（1937-1949）》中举证大量材料证明，伪军虽然名义上附属于日军及伪中央，政权，但“在生存、自身或地方利益、民族意识等错综复杂的考量下，经常务实地依附其他强权”，一切以在乱世中生存为依归，而其立场的变换，都是出于保存实力的现实考虑；任何特定的意识形态都很难打动他们，他们倒是完全理性地以自己的利益为行动指针。相比起来，日本怒而兴师，却并不清楚怎样行动才能将自己的利益最大化，最终迎来近代史上最大的惨败。

  话说回来，抛开道德善恶与意识形态不论，日军所面临的问题、其应对方式，其实至今仍能启人思考。固然它当时是非正义的入侵，而像美军2003年推翻伊拉克萨达姆政权号称是为了“民主自由”和“解放伊拉克人民”，但在政治和战略战术上，美军却可说重犯了日军当年类似的错误：击溃原先的中央政权，解散正规武装和警察，试图自己直接控制，但却没有谈判对手，而这样是无法结束战争的。即便出于成本的考虑，也不得不把战争本地化。然而，在此美军也遇到了日军当年同样的问题，即移交治安职责是长期过程，而征服者（或“解放者”）常常不愿给予太多信任，这些受训的新军队或警察部队，甚至还可能掉转枪口——1937年卢沟桥事变后不久，日军拥立的冀东防共自治政府的保安队反叛，在通州的400名日本人有一半被杀，即所谓“通州事件”；而在伊拉克在阿富汗，由美军训练的警察反过来杀死美军的事件也非仅一起。这一局面如果不能尽速改善，就会形成某种“泥潭”：经费太少而无法收编太多地方武装，正规部队又太少而无力镇压，兵力不足而又补充困难，既不愿进行长期战争，又无法结束战争。也正因此，1940年初在华日军甚至建议“日本缺乏战争余力，将在年底自动撤兵”。而在吃尽了越战泥潭的苦头之后，美军在阿富汗和伊拉克也几乎从一开始就想着尽早撤军。其实，中国才是这些现代战争泥潭的最早版本。

  说到底，所有这类看似实力悬殊的战争，最终的胜败都不取决于军事，而关乎政治。从某种意义上说，当年入侵的日军虽然因占领敌方首都南京而自感达到了这场战争的巅峰，但南京大屠杀已宣告日本在政治上输掉了这场战争。一场无法在道义和意识形态上自圆其说、并说服对方接受的战争，最终既无法赢得当地人的信任，当然更不必提什么“征服收益”了。按经济学家斯蒂格利茨的估算，美国在伊拉克战争中耗费高达三万亿美元，最终又得到了什么呢？这些又非得通过一场耗资巨大的战争才能获得吗？

  已刊《三联生活周刊》2016-5-23（提前出版）

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  勘误：

  p.228：[1938.3.18黎明，日军攻打崇明]一艘军舰在新开河，另一艘在远离新开河的寿安寺：一般地方文献记载都说日军是在海桥港登陆的

  p.231：[崇明岛]该岛的人口相当多，战争开始时大约在40万和45万之间。人口多是因为地域广阔（那时崇明岛大约有1088平方公里）：崇明岛现在面积也仅为此数，而这是1949年后历次围垦大幅增加面积的结果，但在1940年代仅有600平方公里左右

  p.276-277：引爆地雷炸毁满满一火车的日本兵，正如1940年崇明岛上的游击队所做的那样，固然是一种抵抗行为。但当这种抵抗行为导致了附近100多个村庄的村民惨遭日本人的屠杀，这个报复行为对游击队袭击的评价会不会产生影响？按，崇明岛上无铁路、火车，此处应有误；地方文献的记载是，在竖河大烧杀的前一天，抗日游击队在油车湾东渡港附近埋设地雷，炸毁日军装甲车一辆，确切毙敌人数是7人，见

  http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5a45dd3f0102vivp.html

  p.292：朱元璋在1385年的第三个《大告》：大诰